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Mostapha Diss†and Vincent Merlin‡
Preliminary version, January 2008
ABSTRACT: When choosing a voting rule in order to make subsequent decisions,
the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the
object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts
have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is
said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile
of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this paper the menu constituted by
the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}. Under the
Impartial Cultures Assumption (IC), which proposes an a priori model to estimate
the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this
triplet of voting rules.
KEY WORDS: Self-selectivity, Stability, Instability, Scoring Rules, Impartial
Culture Assumption.
1 Introduction
Since long, Social Choice theory has tried to study and model the construction
of collective choices upon individual choices. The applications of this theory are
widely spread since the actual options may be social states, political candidates,
investments, etc. But the choice always concerns alternatives (political candidates
for example) and, until recently, little attention has been paid to the choice of the
voting rule itself.
Koray (2000), Koray and Unel (2003), Barbera` and Jackson (2004), Barbera`
and Bevia´ (2002) and Houy (2005) have been the first to tackle that question and
enrich, thereby, the traditional field of the Social Choice Theory. The individuals
are thus able to choose how to choose and compare the voting rules on the basis of
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their properties. These authors show how that enrichment allows to introduce new
positive axioms and new possibility and impossibility results.
One of the new principle introduced by this literature is the notion of self-
selectivity. Consider a set of possible voting rules. A voting rule is self-selective
(or self stable) if there is no alternative rule that beat the given voting rule if the
given voting rule is used to choose between the rules. Let us try to illustrate this
concept through some examples. Imagine that the votes are made according to the
majority rule: when there is a majority favorable to the majority voting rule, the
majority decision is self-selective. On the other hand, if the dictator is favorable
to the majority voting rule, dictatorship is not self-selective. This exactly what
happened in Spain: the first decision imposed by the King Juan Carlos was to get
rid of his dictatorship in order to establish a democracy. The issue is then to know
whether self-selective voting rules exist.
Though Barbera` and Jackson have applied these ideas to the set of quota rules,
until now, no paper has tried to apply this concept to a set of famous voting rules,
the scoring voting rules. The objective of this paper is to consider the triplet that
forms the three most well known scoring rules: the Borda method (B), the Plurality
rule (P) and the Antiplurality rule (A). In this paper, we will also depart from
the consequentialism hypothesis which have been assumed by most of the authors,
Nicolas Houy being sole exception. Thus, individual will judge and evaluate the
scoring rules on the basis of their intrinsic properties, without taking into account
the fact that the choice of a voting rule may be instrumental for a voter, in order to
increase the chances of the alternatives he prefers.
Though the previous examples have illustrated the notion of self-selectivity for
a given voting rule, the concept becomes more subtle when it comes to judge the
stability of a menu of possible decision rules. We will consider the definition proposed
by Houy (2005): A set of voting rules is (weakly) stable if there always exists at least
one self-selective rule at any profile. Notice however that stronger definitions can be
adopted, taking into account the fact that the dynamic of designations should always
drive the results to a self-selective voting rules (for more details on the different
concepts of stability, see Houy (2005)).
Even with this definition of stability, it is not sure whether any set of rules is
stable: In fact, Nicolas Houy proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for the
stability of a set of neutral1 rules. However, the conditions he proposed are very
general, and he did not seek to apply his concepts to a set of “classical” rules,
like the scoring rules, which are not only neutral, but also anonymous2 We will
first show that the triplet {Borda, P lurality, Antiplurality} may not be stable at
some preference profile. Next, we will evaluate the probability that the triplet
1Following May (1952), a voting rule is neutral is any permutation on the names of alternatives
also permutes the social result accordingly. It guaranties that no alternative is favored by the
voting rule.
2Anonymity has also been defined by May (1952). A rule is anonymous if the social result is
unaffected by permutations on the names of the voters. This condition ensures that all the voters
are treated equally.
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{Borda, P lurality, Antiplurlity} is stable in a very weak sense: at each profile,
there should at least one self-selective rule.
The likelihood of stability of this voting triplet necessarily depends upon the
hypothesis that are set upon the behavior of the voters. We will assume that each
individual have the same probability to pick any of the possible preference types.
This hypothesis is known as the Impartial Culture model (IC) in Social Choice
literature. We will outline a more concise definition of that hypothesis in section 2.
Regarding the technical aspects, we will use a method based upon the Schla¨fli’s
formula in order to derive the desired probabilities. This technique has been widely
used in various articles these last years. See Saari and Tataru (1999), Tataru and
Merlin (1997) and Merlin and al. (2000, 2002).
The paper will be organized as follows: After reminding some basic definitions
dealing with preferences, scoring rules, and probability models in Section 2, we will
go through the different aspects of the stability of the {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}
triplet and the different cases in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the computations.
Finally section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Notations and Definitions
2.1 The Preferences
Throughout all the paper, we will suppose that every voter can rank the set of
candidates (here, voting rules) without ties. Preferences will then be linear orders.
We will denote by abc the fact that candidate a is preferred to candidate b who is
himself preferred to candidate c. In addition to that we will suppose that the voters
are honest, i.e. they reveal their true preferences.
We will assume that the set X = {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} is the menu
proposed to the n individuals. The 3! = 6 types (with strict and transitive preferences)
of preferences are displayed in Table 1 and enumerated from 1 to 6, ni being the
number of agents having the preference type number i:
Table 1: The six preference types among {B,P,A}
APB (n1) ABP (n2) BAP (n3) BPA (n4) PBA (n5) PAB (n6)
The existence or not, of a self-selective rule will thus be determined by the
study of the situation represented by the vector n˜ = (n1, ..., n6) which describes the
number of electors according to their preferences, with
∑6
i=1 ni = n. The set of
possible profiles for a size n population is then:
Dn = {n˜ = (n1, ..., n6),
6∑
i=1
ni = n}
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As we may consider variable electorates, we will define the voting rules on:
D = ∪∞n=1Dn
2.2 Scoring Rules
A voting rule will is thus a mapping from D into 2X \ ∅. At this stage, we assume
that a voting rule is a social choice correspondence, that is, it associate to each
profile at least one (winning) alternative. A scoring voting rule is a social choice
correspondence which depends upon the positions the alternatives occupy in the
preference orderings of the individuals taking part in the collective decision. In other
terms, each individual gives P1 points to the candidate, whom he considers first, P2
to the next, until Pm points for the last candidate, providing that P1 ≥ P2 ≥ ... ≥ Pm
and P1 > Pm. The candidate who has received the greatest amount of points over
the whole population is elected. Our work will only be dealing with the case where
three options are considered, i.e. m = 3.
Hence, for any −1 ≤ s ≤ 1, let us consider the following family of point vectors
Ws = (2, 1 + s, 0); This family describes all the possible scoring rules for the case
of 3 options. In particular, Ws is the Plurality rule for s = −1, the Borda rule
for s = 0 and the Antiplurality rule if s = 1. In fact, We will study the stability
of the triplet {B,W−s,Ws}, that will allow us to get easily results for the triplet
{Borda, P lurality, Antiplurality} for the case s = 1.
With the preferences described in Table 1 and a vector n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6),
the application of the Borda rule, defined by the vector Ws = (2, 1, 0), on the triplet
{Borda, P lurality, Antiplurality} gives us the following scores:
S(W0, n˜, A) = 2(n1 + n2) + (n3 + n6)
S(W0, n˜, B) = 2(n3 + n4) + (n2 + n5)
S(W0, n˜, P ) = 2(n5 + n6) + (n1 + n4)
(1)
with S(W0, n˜, A) being the score of A obtained from the application of the rule s = 0
to the vector n˜ = (n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6). More generally, the application of the rule
defined byWs = (2, 1+s, 0) to the same triplet allows us to find the following scores:
S(Ws, n˜, A) = 2(n1 + n2) + (1 + s)(n3 + n6)
S(Ws, n˜, B) = 2(n3 + n4) + (1 + s)(n2 + n5)
S(Ws, n˜, P ) = 2(n5 + n6) + (1 + s)(n1 + n4)
(2)
We thus find the antiplurality case for s = 1.
The application of the rule given by W−s = (2, 1 − s, 0) provides the following
expressions for the scores:
S(W−s, n˜, A) = 2(n1 + n2) + (1− s)(n3 + n6)
S(W−s, n˜, B) = 2(n3 + n4) + (1− s)(n2 + n5)
S(W−s, n˜, P ) = 2(n5 + n6) + (1− s)(n1 + n4)
(3)
We thus find, the plurality case when s = 1.
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2.3 The Impartial Culture Assumption
The Impartial Culture hypothesis (IC) is one of the most used hypothesis in the
Social Choice literature in order to describe a priori the likelihood of each particular
profile. This hypothesis has been introduced for the first time in literature for the
social choice by Guilbauld (1952) in order to study the Condorcet paradox. The
basic idea of the Impartial Culture IC model is that each voter selects randomly
and independently his preferences from a uniform distribution on the set of possible
types. Hence, all the profiles have the same apparition probability and the occurrence
of a voting situation n˜ = (n1, ..., nm!) is given by:
Pr(n˜) =
n!
n1!n2!...nm!!
(
1
m!
)n (4)
In the case of 3 alternatives, each voter picks any of the preference types displayed
on Table 1 with probability 1
6
; we obtain Pr(n˜) = n!
n1!n2!...n6!
(6)−n. A reader who
wants to improve his knowledge about the use of probability assumptions in voting
theory may consult Berg and Lepelley (1994) or Gehrlein (2002, 2006).
3 The Stability of {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}
3.1 A Definition for Stability
We will now present the definition of stability which we will then apply to the triplet
{Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}. Under the hypothesis of a universal domain, if
one proposes to a society a set of neutral and different voting rules, could we be sure
that the preferences will lead to a self-selective rule chosen by the individuals? In
a global aspect, the notion of stability concerns the choice of one rule among many
of them, independent of initial preferences. Moreover, on applying this notion, one
rule may be considered as preferred to another if it is more stable within a given
initial menu of voting rules.
Definition 1 Consider a set of voting rules E, and a profile of linear preferences
on these voting rules. A voting rule is self-selective at some profile if the choice of
the voting rule is this given rule for this profile. The set E is weakly stable if, at any
profile, there exists at least one self-selective voting rule.
Let us consider two examples to highlight these ideas. We will first consider a
society of 6 individuals. We propose to that society the menu of rules E = {Borda,
Plurality, Antiplurality}. The individual preferences are displayed in Table 2. For
this example, only the Borda rule is self-selective because the application of Borda
gives out Borda as a result (9 points for B, 5 for P and 4 for A). On the other hand,
the application of the Plurality and Antiplurality gives out Borda as a result.
However, Table 3 shows that the menu {B,P,A} may not be stable. With the
preferences displayed in Table 3, we observe that the Antiplurality rule selects the
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Table 2: An example for stability
BPA (2) BAP (2) PBA (1) APB (1)
Table 3: An example of instability
BPA (1) PBA (2) APB (4)
Plurality rule (14 points for P, 8 for A and 6 for B), the Borda count picks out the
Plurality rule (9 points for P, 8 for A and 4 for B) which itself leads to the choice
of the Antiplurality rule (8 points for A, 4 for P and 2 for B). Thus, our objective
is to try to calculate the stability probability of this set of 3 voting rules under the
Impartial Culture Hypothesis. To fulfil this programme, we must first enumerate all
the possible relationships among the three scoring rules.
3.2 The Different Cases
In this study, we will first assume that the size of the population is large, which will
make the probabilities of tied outcomes extremely unlikely3. Thus, the application
of each rule to the triplet {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} only gives the three
possible singletons {Borda}, {Plurality} or {Antiplurality} as a result. In fact,
taking aside the unlikely cases where the results is a tie, we will obtain (3)3 = 27
possible cases. We can partition the 27 cases into 6 categories, represented in the
Table 4.
Table 4: The six possible categories
Categories Cycles Number of self-selective rule
I Cycle with 3 0
II Cycle with 2 0
III Cycle with 2 1
IV 0 cycle 1
V 0 cycle 2
VI 0 cycle 3
All the 27 cases then fall into one of the six categories (see Table 5). The example
displayed on Table 2 corresponds to case 17, and the cycle of Table 3 corresponds
to case 2.
3Marchant (2001) studied the probability of apparition of each tie for scoring voting rules (Borda,
Plurality...). He points out some analytical and numerical results, proving that this probability
tends towards zero when the number of electors is very large.
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Table 5: All the possible cases
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
1 A B P
2 P A B
Table 5.a : Category I
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
3 A A P
4 A A B
5 P B B
6 A B B
7 P B P
8 P A P
Table 5.b : Category II
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
9 P B A
10 B A P
11 A P B
Table 5.c : Category III
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
12 A B A
13 P A A
14 A A A
15 B A B
16 B B P
17 B B B
18 A P P
19 P P B
20 P P P
Table 5.d : Category IV
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
21 B B A
22 B A A
23 A P A
24 P P A
25 B P B
26 B P P
Table 5.e : Category V
the voting rule
Case N0 B P A
27 B P A
Table 5.f : Category VI
3.3 Case 1 in details
Let us consider, for example, the inequalities that characterize the first case presented
on Table 5. Since B gives A, A gives P, and P gives B, we will study the system (5),
and let s go to 1.
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
I1 : S(W0, n˜, A) > S(W0, n˜, P )
I2 : S(W0, n˜, A) > S(WOn˜, B)
I3 : S(W−s, n˜, B) > S(W−s, n˜, P )
I4 : S(W−s, n˜, B) > S(W−s, n˜, A)
I5 : S(Ws, n˜, P ) > S(Ws, n˜, B)
I6 : S(Ws, n˜, P ) > S(Ws, n˜, A)
(5)
This set of inequalities is equivalent to:

I1 : n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
I2 : 2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
I3 : (−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
I4 : −2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
I5 : (1 + s)n1 + (−1− s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1 + s)n4 + (1− s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
I6 : (−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(6)
In the same way, we can easily write down the different inequalities for the other
26 cases. In order to limit the efforts and make our computations easier, we may
state several remarks2. With the help of elementary mathematical operations, we
can easily demonstrate that 6 cases are impossible (5th, 6th, 13th, 18th, 22th et 26th
case). The 5th case is discussed as an example in Appendix I. In order to facilitate
the resolution, notice that many cases can be re-written in the form of reduced
systems, with 4 inequalities only instead of 6. Let us consider the first case being
defined by the system (6). Easy computation demonstrate that I4 + I6 + 2I1 = I3
and I4 + I6 + 2I2 = I5. We can thus reduce our system of inequalities into (7):
I1 : n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
I2 : 2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
I4 : −2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
I6 : (−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(7)
We will present in Appendix II the other reduced systems (1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th, 11th,
14th, 17th, 20th, and the 27th case). For the remaining cases, we will use an indirect
method. In order to calculate the probability of the 3rd case, we will use the results
obtained for the 1st and the 18th cases. Denote by Pr(X) the probability of an event
X. Thus:
Pr(case 1) = Pr(A→ P, B → A, P → B) (8)
A→ P means that the application of the Antiplurality rule to the triplet {B, P, A}
gives out the Plurality as a results. We may thus write that:
Pr(A→ P et B → A) = Pr(case 1) + Pr(case 3) + Pr(case 18) (9)
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We will see further on that we will be able to calculate Pr(A → P et B → A).
But we already know that Pr(case 18) = 0. We can finally write that:
Pr(case 3) = Pr(A→ P et B → A)− Pr(case 1) (10)
We will be using the same method in order to simplify the calculus of the probability
of each remaining cases (4th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 21th, 23th, 24th, 25th). The
details for all the cases are given in Appendix III. In fact, we will need to calculate
the likelihood of the cases displayed in Table 6 where, each time, 4 inequalities are
sufficient.
Table 6: The cases to consider for probability computations
Pr(A→ P and B → A) Pr(A→ P and B → B)
Pr(A¿ B) Pr(A→ B and B → P )
Pr(P ¿ B) Pr(A→ A and B → B)
Pr(A→ P and B → P ) Pr(A→ A and B → A)
Pr(P → B and B → A) Pr(A→ A and B → P )
Pr(P → A and B → B) Pr(A→ B and B → B)
4 Results : probabilities computations
4.1 Case 1 in details
The method used in order to compute the probability of voting events has been
developed by Saari and Tataru (1999), and further developed by Merlin, Tataru and
Valognes (2000, 2002) and Merlin and Valognes (2004). Under IC assumption, each
voter is equally likely to pick independently any of the six preference types. By using
Central Limit Theorem which implies, when n tends towards infinity, the following
formula in R holds for ni :
Pr(a <
(ni − n6 )
σ
√
n
< b) 7→ 1√
2pi
b∫
a
(e
−t2
2 dt) , n→∞ (11)
The measure of
(ni−n6 )
σ
√
n
noted µ(
ni−n6
σ
√
n
) verify the following relation in R: µ(ni−
n
6
σ
√
n
) 7→
1√
2pi
e
−t2
2 λ, where λ is the Lebesgue measure on the one dimensional hyperplane. In
addition, the resolution of our systems requires an application of this theorem in R5:
9
Let
m = (m1,m2, ...m6)
T =
 n1...
n6
−

n
6
...
n
6

σ
√
n
(12)
The Central Limit Theorem in R5 implies, when n tends towards infinity, that :
µ(m) 7→ 1
(
√
2pi)5
e
−|t|2
2 λ (13)
where t = (t1, t2, ..., t6) ∈ R6; |t|2 = t21 + ... + t26 and λ is the Lebesgue measure
on the five dimensional hyperplane (t1+ ...+ t6 = 0). As stated above, the fact that
the Antiplurality designates Plurality, that Borda designates Antiplurality and that
Plurality designates Borda is characterized by the four inequalities of the system
(7):
To compute the probability of this voting situation we will use the following
reasoning. m verify the inequalities of the system (7) if and only if n˜ = (n1...n6)
verify them too. Then we write :
Pr(m verifies(7)) 7→ 1
(
√
2pi)5
∫
C1
(e
−|t|2
2 )dλ (14)
where
C1 = {m ∈ R5, m verifies (7),
6∑
j=1
mj = 0} (15)
The measure µ¯ ≡ 1
(
√
2pi)5
e
−|t|2
2 λ is absolutely continuous and radially symmetric.
Hence, computing P (m satisfies (7)) reduces to finding the measure of the cone
C1. That will be done using the Schla¨fli’s formula (See Kellerhals (1989) and
Milnor (1982)). This formula gives the differential volume on the set of spherical n
simplexes:
dvoln(C1) =
1
(n− 1)
∑
1≤j<k≤n
voln−2(Fj ∩ Fk)dαjk ; vol0 = 1 (16)
where αjk is the dihedral angle formed by the facets Fj and Fk of C1, and n
indicates the simplex dimension. Saari and Tataru (1999) were the first to present
an application of this formula in voting theory in order to compute the probabilities
of some voting events. We present in this work the adaptation of this formula for the
probability computation of the stability of {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} triplet.
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Each facet Fi of the cone C1 corresponds to one of the inequality Ii in equation (7):
F1 : n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
F2 : 2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
F3 : −2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
F4 : (−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(17)
Let −→v1 , −→v2 , −→v3 , −→v4 the normal vectors to the hyperplanes F1, F2, F3, F4, pointing
inside the cone C1:
−→v1 = (1, 2, 1,−1,−2,−1)−→v2 = (2, 1,−1,−2,−1, 1)−→v3 = (−2,−1− s, 1 + s, 2, 1− s,−1 + s)−→v4 = (−1 + s,−2,−1− s, 1 + s, 2, 1− s)
(18)
The relation : −→vi .−→vj = ‖−→vi ‖.‖−→vj ‖. cos(pi−αij) = −‖−→vi ‖.‖−→vj ‖. cos(αij) enables us, in
addition, to find the value of the 6 following angles αij:
α12 =
2pi
3
(19)
α13 = α24 = arccos (
3
2
√
3s2 + 9
) (20)
α14 = α23 = arccos (
3√
3s2 + 9
) (21)
α34 = arccos (
s2 − 3
2(s2 + 3)
) (22)
which implies that:
dα12 = 0 (23)
dα13 = dα24 =
√
3 s
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
(24)
dα14 = dα23 =
√
3
3 + s2
(25)
dα34 = − 4
√
3s
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 10s2 + s4
(26)
The vectors −→v1 , −→v2 , −→v3 , −→v4 are perpendicular to the vectors −→v5 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and−→v6 = (1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1). Then we can calculate the vertex P123 = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ F3 by
solving the system:
P123 :

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 = 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 = 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 = 0
(−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = 0
n1 − n2 + n3 − n4 + n5 − n6 = 0
(27)
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We derive the following results:
P123 :

n1 = 2
n2 = −1
n3 = −1
n4 = 2
n5 = −1
n6 = −1
(28)
By solving similar linear systems, we obtain the other vertices of the cone C1 to be
equal to:
P124 :

n1 = 1
n2 = −2
n3 = 1
n4 = 1
n5 = −2
n6 = 1
P134 :

n1 = 1 + s
n2 = −2
n3 = 1− s
n4 = 1− s
n5 = −2
n6 = 1 + s
P234 :

n1 = 2
n2 = −1 + s
n3 = −1 + s
n4 = 2
n5 = −1− s
n6 = −1− s
(29)
Also we compute:
vol(F1, F2) = ( ̂P123, P124) =
1
3
pi (30)
vol(F1, F3) = vol(F2, F4) = ( ̂P123, P134) = arccos (
3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (31)
vol(F1, F4) = vol(F2, F3) = ( ̂P124, P134) = arccos (
3√
9 + 3s2
) (32)
vol(F3, F4) = ( ̂P234, P134) = pi − arccos ( −3 + s
2
2(3 + s2)
) (33)
We can now easily apply the Schla¨fli ’s formula:
dvol(C) = 2vol(F1, F3)dα13 + 2vol(F1, F4)dα14 + vol(F3, F4)dα34 (34)
We find:
dvol(C)
ds
=
2
√
3 s arccos ( 3
2
√
9+3s2
)
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
+
2
√
3 arccos ( 3√
9+3s2
)
3 + s2
−4
√
3 s (pi − arccos (−3+s2
6+2s2
))
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 10s2 + s4
(35)
12
By Dividing the formula by (n− 1) = 2 and 2pi2 (the volume of the unit sphere
in R4) we obtain:
Pr(case 1, s) =
1
4pi2
s∫
0
(
2
√
3 t arccos( 3
2
√
9+3t2
)
(3 + t2)
√
9 + 4t2
+
2
√
3 arccos( 3√
9+3t2
)
3 + t2
−4
√
3 t (pi − arccos(−3+t2
6+2t2
))
(3 + t2)
√
9 + 10t2 + t4
)
dt
Figure 1: The probability of the 1st case as a function of s
The graphical representation (Figure 1) shows the integration for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. We
may find : Pr(case 1) = Pr(s = 1) = 0.00299346. We will use the same method to
find out the other probabilities. We give out all the corresponding probabilities in
the Table 7.
4.2 General Results
In fact, when examining carefully the systems, we observe that we only need to obtain
three other expressions for the probabilities Pr(cas 1, s) to derive all the other
probabilities. Then probabilities for each possible cases are displayed in Table 7.
Table 8 sums up the results according to the categories.
We have defined a stable set as being a set which always has a self-selective rule.
We may thus state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : Consider a large population, where each voter has a probability of
1/6 to choose one of the six possible linear orders over the set E = {Borda, Plurality,
Antiplurality} of voting rules. Then the set E is stable for 84.49% of the profiles.
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Table 7: The probability for each case
Case N◦ Probabilities Case N◦ Probabilities
1 0.00299346 15 0.03728344
2 0.00299346 16 0.03728344
3 0.03728344 17 0.17821261
4 0.03728344 18 0
5 0 19 0.03728344
6 0 20 0.17821261
7 0.03728344 21 0.03728344
8 0.03728344 22 0
9 0.00299346 23 0.03728344
10 0.00299346 24 0.03728344
11 0.00299346 25 0.03728344
12 0.03728344 26 0
13 0 27 0.00299346
14 0.17821261
Table 8: Probability by category
Categories Cycles Number of self-selective rule Probabilities
I Cycle with 3 0 0.00598692
II Cycle with 2 0 0.14913376
III Cycle with 2 1 0.00898038
IV 0 cycle 1 0.68377159
V 0 cycle 2 0.14913376
VI 0 cycle 3 0.00299346
We may also learn a few other facts from the results displayed in Tables 7 and 8.
In fact, the instability does not come from cases like example displayed in Table 3. A
cycle among the three scoring rules is quite unlikely (less than 0.6% ). The problem
arises when rule 1 designate rule 2 while rule 2 designate rule 1, the third one leading
either to rule 1 and 2.
As a byproduct, we can also compute the probability that all the scoring rules
gives the same results. This is the joint probability of cases 14, 17 and 20. We get
back a probability of 0.5346, in accordance with the result previously obtained by
Fishburn and Gerhlein with different techniques.
It also possible to use differently the results of Table 7, in order to examine
whether a rule is more likely to be self-selective.
The figures in Table 9 means, for example, that the rule {A} (or {P}) is stable
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Table 9: General table
The set Probabilities
{A} 21.85 %
{B} 25.58 %
{P} 21.85 %
{AB} 3.73 %
{AP} 7.46 %
{BP} 3.73 %
{ABP} 0.3 %
Instability 15.51 %
alone with 21,85 %. {AB} are stable alone with 3,73 %.
Thus,
Pr(A is stable alone or with others) = Pr({A}) + Pr({AB})
+Pr({AP}) + Pr({ABP})
= 33.33%
While following the same method we find:
Pr(B is stable alone or with others) = Pr(P is stable alone or with others)
= 33.33%.
Therefore, we can say that no rule is more stable than another.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to illustrate the recently growing literature on the
self-selectivity of voting rules with a classical example, by considering the three
most famous scoring rules. As one may have guessed, the set {Borda, Plurality,
Antiplurality} is not stable, the problem being mainly concentrated on cycles between
two rules.
Thus, is there any escape from impossibility theorems when one consider the
choice of a voting rule ? Several possibilities could be explored:
- First, we may consider different probability assumptions, considering more
homogeneous societies. One possibility would be to consider the Impartial
Anonymous Culture, which assumes that all the vectors n˜ are equally likely.
This assumption is known to slightly diminish the probability of paradoxical
events compared to the IC assumption. Another possibility, quite common in
Social Choice theory, is to consider restriction on the preferences, like singled-
peaked preferences.
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- In this paper, we have considered rules which seldom give tied outcomes.
However, Nicolas Houy has pointed out that one of the key to the stability is
the existence of a rule that selects often many rules. So, why not trying such a
rule, like for example the Copeland method, which always selects alternatives
in the top cycle of the pairwise majority rule ? Indeed, for three voters, the
set E = {Borda, P lurality, Copeland} is stable if we breaks the ties in favor
of the statu quo.
- Another possibility would be to consider consequentialism as a way to model
the preference of the voters over the voting rules. Consequentialism implies
that two voting rules are considered equivalent by the voters if they lead to
the selection of the same alternatives. Thus, preferences may now be weak
ordering, and it is known the presence of weak orderings in the preference
profile tends the reduce the probability of paradoxical outcomes (see Gehrlein
and Valognes (2001) and Merlin and Valognes (2002)).
The careful exploration of these possibilities will tell us whether there is any hope of
finding reasonably stable menu of voting rules that one can propose with confidence
to the choice of the voters.
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NOTES
1. We must highlight that several facts can be geometrically demonstrated by
using some of Saari’s (1994, 1995) important results dealing with the geometry
of scoring rules. In order to simplify the presentation, these results are not
enclosed in the paper.
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Appendix (I)
The 5th case (B → P, P → A,A → B) is describe by the following system of
inequalities:

I1 : −n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
I2 : n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
I3 : (−1− s)n1 + (1 + s)n2 + 2n3 + (1− s)n4 + (−1 + s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
I4 : −2n1 + (−1 + s)n2 + (1− s)n3 + 2n4 + (1 + s)n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
I5 : −2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
I6 : (−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
Evaluating −12 (I3 + I6) enables us to find the inequality
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 < 0
. In comparison with I2 we can say that the 5th case is impossible to realize. This result
also derives from Saari (1994, 1995), which states that in the three candidate case, all the
scoring rules coincide if and only if the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule select the
same winner. Cases 6, 13,18, 22 and 26 obey to the same logic.
Appendix (II)
• 1stcase : B → A, P → B et A→ P
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1 + s)n2 + (1− s)n3 + 2n4 + (1 + s)n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
• 2ndcase : B → P, P → A et A→ B
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
• 9thcase : B → P, P → B et A→ A
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 + (1 + s)n2 + 2n3 + (1− s)n4 + (−1 + s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• 10thcase : B → B, P → A et A→ P
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
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• 11thcase : B → A, P → P et A→ B
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
• 14thcase : B → A, P → A et A→ A
2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• 17thcase : B → B, P → B et A→ B
(−1− s)n1 + (1 + s)n2 + 2n3 + (1− s)n4 + (−1 + s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1 + s)n2 + (1− s)n3 + 2n4 + (1 + s)n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
• 20thcase : B → P, P → P et A→ P
(1 + s)n1 + (−1− s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1 + s)n4 + (1− s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1− s)n3 + (1 + s)n4 + 2n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
• 27thcase : B → B, P → P et A→ A
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + (−1− s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1 + s)n4 + (1− s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
Appendix (III)
• Pr(case 4) = Pr(A¿ B)− Pr(case 11)
• Pr(case 7) = Pr(P ¿ B)− Pr(case 9)
• Pr(case 8) = Pr(A→ P et B → P )− Pr(case 7)− Pr(case 20)
• Pr(case 12) = Pr(P → B et B → A)− Pr(case 1)
• Pr(case 15) = Pr(P → A et B → B)− Pr(case 10)
• Pr(case 16) = Pr(A→ P et B → B)− Pr(case 10)
• Pr(case 19) = Pr(A→ B et B → P )− Pr(case 2)
• Pr(case 21) = Pr(A→ A et B → B)− Pr(case 27)
• Pr(case 23) = Pr(A→ A et B → A)− Pr(case 12)− Pr(case 14)
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• Pr(case 24) = Pr(A→ A et B → P )− Pr(case 9)
• Pr(case 25) = Pr(A→ B et B → B)− Pr(case 15)− Pr(case 17)
Appendix (IV)
• A→ P et B → A
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
• A¿ B
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
• P ¿ B
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 + (1 + s)n2 + 2n3 + (1− s)n4 + (−1 + s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1 + s)n2 + (1− s)n3 + 2n4 + (1 + s)n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• A→ P et B → P
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
• P → B et B → A
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 + (1 + s)n2 + 2n3 + (1− s)n4 + (−1 + s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1 + s)n2 + (1− s)n3 + 2n4 + (1 + s)n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• P → A et B → B
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
• A→ P et B → B
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
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• A→ B et B → P
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
• A→ A et B → B
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• A→ A et B → A
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• A→ A et B → P
−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
• A→ B et B → B
−2n1 − n2 + n3 + 2n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + 2n3 + n4 − n5 − 2n6 > 0
−2n1 + (−1− s)n2 + (1 + s)n3 + 2n4 + (1− s)n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
(−1 + s)n1 + (1− s)n2 + 2n3 + (1 + s)n4 + (−1− s)n5 − 2n6 > 0
Appendix (IV)
Our results depend on four different probabilities. The other calculations give us
similar results. The case N◦ 1 has been presented previously, it’s similar to the followings
cases: 2, 9, 10, 11 and 27. Here we present the three other probabilities :
• 14thcase : B → A, P → A and A→ A
This case is defined by the following system:

2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
(36)
Let
F1 : 2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
F2 : (1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 > 0
F3 : 2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 > 0
F4 : (1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
(37)
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and −→v1 , −→v2 , −→v3 , −→v4 the normal vectors to the hyperplanes F1, F2, F3, F4 :
−→v1 = (2, 1− s,−1 + s,−2,−1− s, 1 + s)−→v2 = (1− s, 2, 1 + s,−1− s,−2,−1 + s)−→v3 = (2, 1 + s,−1− s,−2,−1 + s, 1− s)−→v4 = (1 + s, 2, 1− s,−1 + s,−2,−1− s)
(38)
We find the value of the 6 following angles αij :
α12 = α34 =
2pi
3
(39)
α13 = α24 = arccos (
−3 + s2
3 + s2
) (40)
α14 = α23 = arccos (
−3 + s2
2(3 + s2)
) (41)
(42)
which implies that:
dα12 = dα34 = 0 (43)
dα13 = dα24 =
−2√3
3 + s2
(44)
dα14 = dα23 =
−4s√3
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 10s2 + s4
(45)
(46)
Then we can calculate the vertex P123 = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ F3 by solving the system:
P123 :

2n1 + (1− s)n2 + (−1 + s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1− s)n5 + (1 + s)n6 = 0
(1− s)n1 + 2n2 + (1 + s)n3 + (−1− s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1 + s)n6 = 0
2n1 + (1 + s)n2 + (−1− s)n3 − 2n4 + (−1 + s)n5 + (1− s)n6 = 0
(1 + s)n1 + 2n2 + (1− s)n3 + (−1 + s)n4 − 2n5 + (−1− s)n6 > 0
(47)
We derive the following results:
P123 :

n1 = −1
n2 = s+12
n3 = s+12
n4 = −1
n5 = −s+12
n6 = −s+12
(48)
By solving similar linear systems, we obtain the other vertices of the cone C1 to be equal
to:
P124 :

n1 = s+12
n2 = −1
n3 = −s+12
n4 = −s+12
n5 = −1
n6 = s+12
P134 :

n1 = 1
n2 = s−12
n3 = s−12
n4 = 1
n5 = −s−12
n6 = −s−12
P234 :

n1 = s−12
n2 = 1
n3 = −s−12
n4 = −s−12
n5 = 1
n6 = s−12
(49)
21
Also we compute:
vol(F1, F2) = vol(F3, F4) = ( ̂P123, P124) =
2
3
pi (50)
vol(F1, F3) = vol(F2, F4) = ( ̂P123, P134) = arccos (
−3 + s2
3 + s2
) (51)
vol(F1, F4) = vol(F2, F3) = ( ̂P124, P134) = pi − arccos ( −3 + s
2
2(3 + s2)
) (52)
We find:
dvol(C)
ds
=
−4√3 arccos (−3+s2
3+s2
)
3 + s2
−
8
√
3s(pi − arccos ( −3+s2
2(3+s2)
))
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 10s2 + s4
(53)
Finally we obtain:
Pr(case 14, s) =
1
3
+
1
4pi2
s∫
0
{−4
√
3 arccos (−3+t
2
3+t2
)
3 + t2
−
8
√
3t(pi − arccos ( −3+t2
2(3+t2)
))
(3 + t2)
√
9 + 10t2 + t4
}dt (54)
and Pr(case 14) = Pr(s = 1) = 0.17821261
The case 14 give us the similar probability than the case 17 and the case 20.
• Subcase 1: A→ P and B → A
This subcase is defined by the following system:

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(55)
Let
F1 : n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
F2 : 2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
F3 : (1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
F4 : (−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(56)
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and −→v1 , −→v2 , −→v3 , −→v4 the normal vectors to the hyperplanes F1, F2, F3, F4 :
−→v1 = (1, 2, 1,−1,−2,−1)−→v2 = (2, 1,−1,−2,−1, 1)−→v3 = (1− s,−1 + s,−2,−1− s, 1 + s, 2)−→v4 = (−1− s,−2,−1 + s, 1− s, 2, 1 + s)
(57)
We find the value of the 6 following angles αij :
α12 = α34 =
2pi
3
(58)
α13 = α24 = arccos (
3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (59)
α14 = arccos (
3√
9 + 3s2
) (60)
α23 = pi − arccos ( 3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (61)
(62)
which implies that:
dα12 = dα34 = 0 (63)
dα13 = dα24 =
√
3s
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
(64)
dα14 =
√
3
3 + s2
(65)
dα23 =
−√3s
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
(66)
(67)
Then we can calculate the vertex P123 = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ F3 by solving the system:
P123 :

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 = 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 = 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 = 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(68)
We derive the following results:
P123 :

n1 = 1
n2 = 1
n3 = −2
n4 = 1
n5 = 1
n6 = −2
(69)
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By solving similar linear systems, we obtain the other vertices of the cone C1 to be equal
to:
P124 :

n1 = 1
n2 = −2
n3 = 1
n4 = 1
n5 = −2
n6 = 1
P134 :

n1 = −1 + s
n2 = 2
n3 = −1− s
n4 = −1− s
n5 = 2
n6 = −1 + s
P234 :

n1 = 2
n2 = −1 + s
n3 = −1 + s
n4 = 2
n5 = −1− s
n6 = −1− s
(70)
Also we compute:
vol(F1, F2) = vol(F3, F4) = ( ̂P123, P124) =
2
3
pi (71)
vol(F1, F3) = vol(F2, F4) = vol(F2, F3) = ( ̂P123, P134) = arccos(
3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (72)
vol(F1, F4) = ( ̂P124, P134) = pi − arccos( 3√
9 + 3s2
) (73)
We find:
dvol(C)
ds
=
s
√
3 arccos( 3
2
√
9+3s2
)
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
+
√
3{pi − arccos( 3√
9+3s2
)}
3 + s2
(74)
Finally we obtain:
Pr(Subcase 1, s) =
1
4pi2
s∫
0
{
t
√
3 arccos( 3
2
√
9+3t2
)
(3 + t2)
√
9 + 4t2
+
√
3{pi − arccos( 3√
9+3t2
)}
3 + t2
}dt (75)
and Pr(Subcase 1) = Pr(s = 1) = 0.04027691
The case (A → P and B → A) give us the similar probability than the followings
cases:
A¿ B A→ P and B → B)
P ¿ B A→ B and B → P
P → B and B → A A→ A and B → B
P → A and B → B A→ A and B → P
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• Subcase 2: A→ P and B → P
This subcase is defined by the following system:

−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(76)
Let
F1 : −n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 > 0
F2 : n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 > 0
F3 : (1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 > 0
F4 : (−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(77)
and −→v1 , −→v2 , −→v3 , −→v4 the normal vectors to the hyperplanes F1, F2, F3, F4 :
−→v1 = (−1,−2,−1, 1, 2, 1)−→v2 = (1,−1,−2,−1, 1, 2)−→v3 = (1− s,−1 + s,−2,−1− s, 1 + s, 2)−→v4 = (−1− s,−2,−1 + s, 1− s, 2, 1 + s)
(78)
We find the value of the 6 following angles αij :
α12 = α34 =
2pi
3
(79)
α13 = α24 = pi − arccos ( 3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (80)
α14 = α23 = pi − arccos ( 3√
9 + 3s2
) (81)
(82)
which implies that:
dα12 = dα34 = 0 (83)
dα13 = dα24 =
−√3s
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
(84)
dα14 = dα23 =
−√3
3 + s2
(85)
(86)
Then we can calculate the vertex P123 = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ F3 by solving the system:
P123 :

−n1 − 2n2 − n3 + n4 + 2n5 + n6 = 0
n1 − n2 − 2n3 − n4 + n5 + 2n6 = 0
(1− s)n1 + (−1 + s)n2 − 2n3 + (−1− s)n4 + (1 + s)n5 + 2n6 = 0
(−1− s)n1 − 2n2 + (−1 + s)n3 + (1− s)n4 + 2n5 + (1 + s)n6 > 0
(87)
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We derive the following results:
P123 :

n1 = 1
n2 = 1
n3 = −2
n4 = 1
n5 = 1
n6 = −2
(88)
By solving similar linear systems, we obtain the other vertices of the cone C1 to be equal
to:
P124 :

n1 = 1
n2 = −2
n3 = 1
n4 = 1
n5 = −2
n6 = 1
P134 :

n1 = −1 + s
n2 = 2
n3 = −1− s
n4 = −1− s
n5 = 2
n6 = −1 + s
P234 :

n1 = −1− s
n2 = −1− s
n3 = 2
n4 = −1 + s
n5 = −1 + s
n6 = 2
(89)
Also we compute:
vol(F1, F2) = vol(F3, F4) = ( ̂P123, P124) =
2
3
pi (90)
vol(F1, F3) = vol(F2, F4) = ( ̂P123, P134) = arccos(
3
2
√
9 + 3s2
) (91)
vol(F1, F4) = vol(F2, F3) = ( ̂P124, P134) = pi − arccos( 3√
9 + 3s2
) (92)
We find:
dvol(C)
ds
=
−2s√3 arccos( 3
2
√
9+3s2
)
(3 + s2)
√
9 + 4s2
−
2
√
3{pi − arccos( 3√
9+3s2
)}
3 + s2
(93)
Finally we obtain:
Pr(Subcase 2, s) =
1
3
+
1
4pi2
∫ s
0
{
−2t√3 arccos( 3
2
√
9+3t2
)
(3 + t2)
√
9 + 4t2
−
2
√
3{pi − arccos( 3√
9+3t2
)}
3 + t2
}dt(94)
and Pr(Subcase 2) = Pr(s = 1) = 0.25277950
This case (A→ P and B → P ) give the similar probability than the followings cases:
A→ A and B → A A→ B and B → B
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